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I. DEQ'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. RESPONSE TO DEQ'S "NATURE OF THE CASE"

DEQ explains the "Nature of the Case" by stating the "purpose" of the IDAP A Rules is to
regulate "solid waste" at processing facilities so as not to pose a "health or environmental hazard" with
open dumping grounds. Appellants have never disputed Legislature's policy or intent when establishing
DEQ as a separate Department. The question is not the "purpose" of the Rules, but the "scope" and
"application of the Rules, particularly the exclusions, in meeting the purpose and Legislative objectives.
Natural organic plant residues have never been a health or environmental hazard; plant residues are
everywhere in Idaho; on residential properties, farm grounds, and agricultural composting operations.
Never, in the prior ten years, have plant residues been regarded a "solid waste" under the IDAP A Rules,
as administered by DEQ and composting operations.
DEQ's "purpose" of the Rules match the "policy" and "intent" of the Legislator, where "Policy"
and "intent" are declared::
39-102. State policy on environmental protection. (1) ..... to provide for the
protection of the environment and the promotion of personal health and to thereby
protect and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the people of this state.
39-102A. Legislative intent in creating department of environmental quality..... :
(1) .... to protect human health and the environment as its sole mission is in the
public's interest;
Throughout the entire statutory scheme of Title 39, nowhere is plant residue declared to
be a health or hazard to the environment. These natural organic substances are found on every
lawn and in every garden in Idaho.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

PG.4

DEQ chose to file this “civil action” in 2015, asserting a right to regulate “compost”, yet
for an entire decade preceding their “inspection” of Gibson’s operation on March 29, 2013, DEQ
never once sought or claimed that right to regulate compost under any theory, health,
environment, solid waste, or otherwise. What changed, over a decade later that DEQ would
decide to call “compost” a “solid waste”, and no longer excluded?
IDAPA Rules have existed since 2003, and Gibson’s composting operation have stored
far in excess of 600 cubic yards of compost, at any one time, since 2004. Why now is it being
considered a “solid waste processing facility”, when neither the facts, the Rules, the operation,
nor the knowledge of this operation possessed by DEQ has changed in any manner during the
past decade?
If there has been a policy change, when and what was it, and why? Appellants see DEQ
as not only violating their own established “deference” with a change in the scope and
application of their previously recognized exclusions from the Rules, but now find DEQ predisposed to ignore what is believed to be the controlling Federal law, with the pre-emptive
effects established by I. C. §39-7404, embracing EPA’s Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Code of Federal Regulation, 40 CFR 261.2(e), wherein certain categories and
uses of certain substances are excluded from “solid waste”.
The intended scope and application of the IDAPA Rules (Rule 58) and Federal
regulations and these exclusions is the core issue of this appeal, impacting the “Nature of This
Case” and the decision to be rendered in this appeal.
After ten years of consistent application of the IDAPA Rules, upon what reasoning has
the “scope” of application transmuted or evolved into a need to regulate composting operations,
when such substances were always before deemed excluded?
Why would DEQ choose to disregard the pre-emptive effects of Federal law! Why,
during the entire ten (10) years following the adoption of the IDAPA Rules, there has never been
an “inspection” or “claimed” authority to regulate Gibson’s composting operations? Under what
“unannounced” change of circumstance has Gibson commenced the operation of a “solid waste
processing facility” when his operations have never changed, dating back to 1974, and told were
excluded?
Is it just coincidence this “inspection” and “claimed” authority to regulate Gibson’s
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compost operations came after Ada County was unable to force Gibson to secure a conditional
use permit (CUP) under the county’s pre-empted ordinance? The statewide legislative effects of
“permitted use” under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA) includes composting operations, declared to
be agricultural activities, facilities, and operations, enjoying a permitted use statewide, preempting City or County attempts to impose zoning restrictions or regulations (See I. C. §§224501, 22-4502(2)(d)&(f), and 22-4504). The statutory provisions (I. C. §22-4502(2)(d)&(f),
defined plant waste and plant compost operations as being agricultural activities, insulated from
both nuisance claims (I. C. §22-4504) and conditional use permits (I. C. §22-4501), rendering
Ada County’s attempt to impose zoning regulations ineffective and void.
Following the County’s failure to regulate Gibson’s composting operations, DEQ elects
to conduct their warrantless “inspection”, the first in ten years, having no history of regulating
Gibson’s composting activities since the adoption of the IDAPA Rules.
A different agency, but nonetheless an agency destined to regulate, and similarly
disposed to disregard any exclusions before respected, and disregarding any pre-emptive effects
that are seen to preclude any right to regulate composting operations.
Gibson’s composting activities (operating since 1974) have been known by every City,
County, State Department, agency, council, commission, and Division, becoming a household
name to personnel in the departments of Health and Welfare, Central District Health, Boise
Municipal Airport, Ada County Commissioners, Boise City Council, Department of Agriculture,
the Fourth district courts, even securing opinions from the Idaho Supreme Court, dating back to
the early ‘90’s, and yes, even DEQ officials, as a division and as a department, well aware of
Gibson, all judicial proceedings, and Gibson’s historic operations. DEQ has been well aware of
the quantities of compost stored at his facilities for decades, with records and files that addressed
Gibson’s operations at least back to 1992. (See Tr. p. 263, L. 12) (R. p. 510-513, ¶¶ 4, 3 (sic), 4,
and 5). DEQ’s exhibits confirmed aerial photographs within their files, one dated in 2011 ((See
R. p. 871, Exhibit No. 10; R. p. 880, Exhibit No. 10), with Dean Ehlert (DEQ’s official)
admitting DEQ has known of Gibson operations dating back to 1992 (Tr. p. 263, L. 10-12).
Gibson was told by agents with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (ISDA) his
composting operations were registered and regulated by ISDA, following the enactments of the
Right to Farm Act (RTFA) (Title 22, Ch. 45) in 1981, and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act
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(SAPAA) (Title 22, Ch. 22) enacted in 2001. (R. p. 94, L. 2). For ten years, DEQ has been
cognizant of that, and stayed out of composting activities.
IDAPA Rules function within the scope of what constitutes a “solid waste”, and cannot
go outside the applicable state and federal law, and there remains the issue: what law applies.
There must be a recognized “solid waste” definition that is consistent and universally recognized
with the state and federal agencies, and some consistent law must control DEQ’s regulation. The
Policy and Intent of the Legislature has never declared “compost”, or its ingredients, “grass
clippings and leaves”, any risk to human health or the environment, so where is DEQ headed,
knowing these substances, now limited to “ingredients” are in every yard, landscape, and farm
scattered across America?
Though uncertain why DEQ has sought this change of policy, we certainly know where
they ended up; declared unable to regulate compost, though having thrown everything at it but
logic and reason. The lower court concluded “compost” is not a “solid waste”, using a classical
definition, but with that definition, concluded the organic “ingredients”, because they were
“discarded”, are a “solid waste”. It is only because of the word “discard” that compost
“ingredients” are “solid waste”.
To conclude these ingredients, grass clippings and leaves, are a “solid waste” because
they were “discarded”, is that justification to authorize regulation? The lower court declared
“compost” (comprised solely of those ingredients) not a “solid waste”, using the same
assessment: “compost” was not “discarded” or “abandoned”. This is why the RCRA and 40 CFR
261.2(e) must be allowed to clarify the current federal analysis, and the clarification of 40 CFR
261.2(e) applies, which overrode this “discard” concept.
No longer does “discard” fit the definition for defining “solid waste”, given the era of
these organic recycling programs. These ingredients were never “discarded”, but rather
specifically transported and delivered to a composting operation for the specific purpose to
recycle an organic ingredient into a product to substitute commercial fertilizers, called
“compost”, clearly not intended to be discarded, as the substance would instead be delivered to a
solid waste disposal facility destined for permanent disposal. That is the purpose and recognized
intent being promoted by the Federal regulations.
These organic substances, the ingredients and compost they become, are at every lawn,
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park, and field throughout Idaho and America, from little amounts to massive quantities, and a
composting operation only enhances the natural process, accomplished by the more efficient
blending and mixture and combining that mixture with other compost and soil substances to be
returned to the soils as a soil amendment and plant enrichment. There is no permanent disposal
of anything at an agricultural composting operation.
Because DEQ received a cold shoulder from the lower court, declaring compost not a
“solid waste”, compost could no longer be the volumetric amount to establish a “Tier” II”
Category of a “solid waste processing facility”, so the determination must be the volume
presence of the “ingredients” only.
DEQ was handed a stark disappointment to their new policy agenda, as DEQ had no
desire to regulate these organic “ingredients”, but the court said that only was “discarded”.
Something is wrong with relying upon the act of delivery as the criteria for being classified solid
waste, thus Appellants believe to be the reason for the clarification and exclusion that has found
in the federal regulation.
Appellants believe this explains why the Federal enactment, Resource Conservation
Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Code of Federal Regulation (40 CFR 261.2(e) sought to address
this clarifying need and concern over ingredients delivered to recycle programs, and seek to
bring clarity to the confusion regarding ingredients used to make a product that will become a
substitute for commercial products (i.e. compost and humus as a substitute for commercial
granulated and liquefied fertilizers), and get away from discard.
There is no logic that organic ingredients be treated as a “solid waste”, when the product,
compost, is not subject to any DEQ regulations. “Discard” should not be the criteria used to
classify these ingredients.
This “discard” definition given to the physical “act” of delivery is a mischaracterization
of the intended purpose to be accomplished by the placement of these organic ingredients at a
composting operation. Appellants would argue the federal clarifications came about to alter this
prior analysis in using “discard” (discard has been a federal concept) to define what constitutes a
“solid waste”, given what has become these environmentally friendly recyclable programs that
keep these organic ingredients from being delivered to the landfills for permanent disposal.
DEQ only wanted to regulate the compost at a Gibson operation, never expressed any
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concern over the ingredients. DEQ took no measurements or pictorial identification during their
“inspection” on March 29, 2013, as they had no desire to consider anything but their focus on
compost, estimating that presence to be over 10,000 cubic yards. Ingredients, however, are only
delivered during the summer and fall months, as Gibson uses only grass clippings and leaves,
nothing else. Thus, this court can appreciate there were no identifiable or quantification of any
“ingredients” present on March 29, 2013, as the climate was just coming out of winter, with
about five months passed since grass clippings were delivered, and about four months since
leaves were delivered, so what DEQ observed on March 29, 2013 were just quantities of
compost.
What DEQ wanted to achieve, and what they got from the court, has become a most
unexpected and unwanted result; handed a decision that denies DEQ regulatory authority over
compost, allows regulation of “ingredients” about which they had no desire to regulate, and
cannot quantify. DEQ realizes they cannot effectively quantify any ingredients at any one time
because of the nature of the composting operation.
DEQ has been handed nothing meaningful, essentially authorized to now chase a ghost,
as it is an impossibility to measure grass clippings and leaves when they are immediately
blended, mixed and incorporated into existing compost each day upon delivery. You cannot
measure or regulate what disappears and converts to compost immediately upon incorporation.
The agenda to regulate compost has become an enigma or paradox, looking for a phantom
substance that evades shape or form immediately within the transformation process, and by any
definition, becomes a component of compost upon incorporation. These ingredients are not
delivered in fleets of transport trucks, but periodic and occasional deliveries throughout the
summer and fall months, and once incorporated cannot be regulated. This is the result DEQ
succeeded to accomplish.
The “Nature of This Case” requires the understanding these organic ingredients must be
incorporated virtually the moment of their arrival, so the moisture is captured and not lost to
evaporation. Once blended, mixed, and incorporated into the existing compost, the moisture
continues to fuel the natural decomposition process, enhancing the reaction with the nitrogen,
oxygen, moisture, and organisms. The grass clippings are rich with nitrogen and moisture,
containing significant water content, up to 90%, and that is blended with the less moist and
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nitrogen deficient leaves, and upon incorporation commences heat generation, where microbe
organisms conduct the transformation. For all practical purposes, everything, when incorporated
becomes a component of compost. All this matter is destined for return to the soils, as a natural
soil enhancement and plant enrichment, which is the building block of plant life, the sustenance
of all living creatures.
So what actually defines the “Nature of This Case”? It is the natural process of compost,
as that is the focus of this controversy. DEQ failed to get what they sought to achieve in this case
(a right to regulate compost), so what can they expect from this appeal? DEQ doesn’t have any
basis to alter the exclusion of “compost” from “solid waste”, and have not appealed that ruling in
the Decision, and DEQ never wanted to regulate “ingredients”. So why would DEQ want the
ingredients now to remain subject to regulation when they cannot be quantified to regulate? Is
DEQ just being another preverbal “dog in the manger”, wanting to harass composting operations,
knowing they can inspect (with a warrant) but cannot practically regulate their ingredients or
determine “Tier” category?
What do Appellants want from this appeal? They want the “discard” criteria reversed;
they want the federal regulatory criteria implemented, as per Idaho statute. There has been no
evidence of any volumetric determination of any “ingredients” on March 29, 2013, being the
only date for which there was any inspection of a violation.
What the lower court then decided to do, realizing there was this clear lack of evidence,
was to go beyond the inspection date in the pleadings, and viewed deliveries of Boise Parks grass
clippings, and ACHD leaves, delivered over different years during the seasons, but again, there
was no evidence of any quantitative presence of any ingredient being at the operation “at any one
time” that was not part of the compost rows. These subsequent dates, years, and events are
irrelevant to the allegation within DEQ’s pleadings, but notwithstanding, the evidence did not
prove there was ever ingredients present, at any one time, that even exceeded the BRC (Below
Regulatory Concern, “at any one time”.
Given the reality as to what the lower court was presented, no competent or substantial
evidence will support any finding that a “Tier II” processing facility was in operation on March
29, 2013,or at or on any other specific date or time.
Appellants would request this court construe the IDAPA Rule exclusions to be
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interpreted to mean what they were construed to mean for the past decade, as construed by DEQ
and their agents; that plant residues are not "solid waste", and the word "crop" was never
construed to exclude grasses and trees, and grass clippings and leaves are a crop (plant) residue,
and Irrespective of the IDAPA Rules, and any ambiguity within these IDAP A Rules as to crop
(plant) residues, the State statute (I. C. §39-7404) mandates that the Federal enactment, Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Code of Federal Regulation (to include 40 CFR

261.2(e)) pre-empts any attempt to define "solid waste" in any broader definition that attempts to
disregard the exclusions established through 40 CFR 261.2( e).
B. REPLY TO DEQ'S STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

DEQ's authority stems from Title 39, Health and Safety, within which is the Idaho
Environmental Protection and Health Act (IEPHA) is established. Within Title 39, there are 93

Chapters, within which is the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), Chapter 74, I. C. §§ 397403 and 39-7404, expressly pertaining to solid waste facilities, all of which statutes on the
subject matter are to be read together, to glean the purpose and intent of the Legislature, as these
provisions all relate to what is defined to be "solid waste" to be processed in a "solid waste
processing facility", with solid waste management requirements. The Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act (ISWFA) addresses these federal provisions. As to the need to review the entire

Title, In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009), the
court stated:
When engaging in statutory construction, this Court has a "duty to ascertain the
legislative intent, and give effect to that intent." Id. 11 (T/he Court must construe a
statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine
the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal
citation omitted). 11 [The Court] also must take account of all other matters such as the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute. 11 Id."
(Emphasis added).

The ISWFA includes the pre-emptive effects of the federal enactment, Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 's), which has

come to now include 40 CFR 261.2( e), where recyclable substances in three specific uses or
applications are excluded, of which composting operation fits these categories of uses. The
RCRA is declared by ISWFA to apply in Idaho, through the effects of I.C §39-7404, prohibiting
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promulgation ofregulations with a broader definition of "solid waste".
The DEQ's Solid Waste Management Rules--- IDAP A 58.01.06. (subpart .001 (Title and
Scope), subpart (.03) specifically declared (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b)

(These Rules Do Not Apply to the following .... (b)(ii) and (b)(iii). --- was thought to exclude
these organic plant residues and agricultural wastes, but notwithstanding, the effects of RCRA
through the mandate within ISWFA, LC §39-7404, should prove to be conclusive as to the preemptive effects of 40 CFR 261.2(e).
It remains for this court to interpret what was intended by the exclusions identified within
IDAPA Rule 58.01.06.001(.03)(b)(ii) and (b)(iii). when excluding manure, crop (plant) residue,

and agricultural wastes, as all these substances are intended to be returned to the soil at
agronomic rates. The Rule refers to these organic substances as ''wastes", not "solid" wastes,
recognizing they decompose and become natural compost.

C.

RESPONSE TO DEQ'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
DEQ's states: "In 2013, DEQ learned of Gibson's facility through an odor complaint". If

that statement is being expressed with the intent to conceal DEQ's knowledge of Gibson's
operations, Appellants take exception, as the files and records within the Department reveal DEQ
has been aware of Gibson's operations for decades, with aerial photography and records dating
back to 1992, confirmed by Dean Ehlert during trial (Tr. p. 263, L. 10-12).
There has never been confirmation Devin Downs was even referring to Gibson's
operation, [Black Diamond (Gibson's operation) as opposed to Diamond Street, a completely
unrelated operation], but notwithstanding, Dean Ehlert confirmed no odor of any concern was
found, and no health or environmental hazard to the air, soil or water.
DEQ's "factual statements" confirm DEQ's objective was to exercise a regulatory right
over "compost", expressing not concern over "ingredients". When the "inspection" and
"observation" was made on March 29, 2013, nothing had been delivered to the operation since
fall of 2012, thus no samples would reveal anything but compost, as it was all the samecompost--located in the windrows stored at the operation.
DEQ has acknowledged within their statement:
"After the March 29, 2013 inspection, DEQ concluded that the facility
qualified as a Tier II solid waste processing facility" [solely based on the appearance of
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the volumes of compost, not any “ingredients”]. “As noted, DEQ’s Solid Waste
Management Rules requires such facilities to meet certain regulatory requirements, but,
to date, neither David Gibson nor VHS have complied with the applicable requirements.”
[never before told or declared to be subject to any regulation over the preceding ten (10)
years concerning compost]. “DEQ first sought compliance with the requirements through
administrative means. (Trial Exs. 1, 3, 6.)” [the subject of discussion was only
“compost”, not any “ingredients”, as ingredients were never the concern of DEQ]
“When that proved unsuccessful, DEQ filed this civil action on March 5, 2015. (R. 13–
25.)” [from this civil action, the court determined that “compost and humus” were not a
“solid waste”, defeating DEQ’s sole objective throughout this controversy]. (All italics
Appellants’ commentary).
The lower court described the controversy to be: “simply whether Mr. Gibson is
operating a Tier II Solid Waste Processing Facility” (R. p. 1203, L21-22), and with that view in
mind, declared compost excluded. Therefore, the only relevant substance to constitute a “solid
waste” would be the “ingredients” to determine the “volume” of the “operation” and there were
none. The time of year alone confirms there were no” ingredients” to be measured or quantified,
as would be required to address any “Tier II” compliance requirement. DEQ has confirmed
within their “Statement of Facts”: They collected no samples, conducted no tests, and did not
touch any materials at the facility.” (Emphasis added) Once again, “ingredients”, (plant
residue), were not their concern; it was the volumes of compost that comprised their “Tier II”
target objective, nothing else.
The “fact” remains DEQ filed their “civil action”, under I.C. §39-108, relying upon an
“observation” of “volumes” of “compost” stored at the operation on March 29, 2013.
The lower court has sided with Gibson, (as to the compost), but found the ingredients
(none of which were ever quantified, as none were seasonally present) to be a “solid waste”, only
because the court concluded they were “discarded”. This application of “discard” requires this
court to consider and apply the correct law, to confirm that such ingredients, grass clippings and
leaves, when used as direct ingredients in a recycling program, to produce a product to be used
as a substitute for a commercial products, are excluded from “solid waste” and exempt from
DEQ regulation, as mandated by controlling federal law.
It is true Gibson disputed DEQ’s authority to regulate compost during the “administrative
proceeding”, and following the “civil action”, consistently contending the IDAPA Rule had
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been determined over the decade to exclude composting operations from solid waste processing
facilities, and thereafter advanced the argument, in the evolving development of his argument,
that if that were not supported as being the intent within the Rules, then the effects of certain
Federal enactments controlled the definition of “solid waste”, under certain uses and
applications, finding the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) limits Idaho’s ability to
broaden that definition, mandated by the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act, I.C. §39-7404, through
which federal limitations were binding on DEQ’s ability to promulgate a definition of “solid waste”
broader than allowed under certain applications, as declared through the recycling provisions within
the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), as the enactment is regulated by 40 CFR
261.2(e).
DEQ states: “the court concluded that Gibson’s facility processed non-exempt solid
waste, in volumes exceeding the Tier II threshold and without meeting the applicable regulatory
requirements. (R. 1198–1217.)”. That remains to be an issue decided by this court, as the
evidence does not support that. The “non-exempt solid waste” refers to “ingredients” only, and
does not allow the “compost” to be within any volumes. There lies one of the issues to be
addressed within this appeal: What was the volume of such “ingredients” on March 29, 2013, or
at any one time?
DEQ has never proven, by the evidence presented at trial, the presence of “ingredients”,
in such volumes, “at any one time”, let alone on the date alleged in the “civil action”, March 29,
2013. There has been no evidence to support the findings and conclusions that Gibson was
conducting a “Tier II Processing Facility” on March 29, 2013, or at any other time.
DEQ states: “Throughout the case, DEQ has pursued one objective: Gibson’s
“compliance with regulatory requirements necessary for the protection of human health and the
environment from the hazards presented by solid waste management activities …”.(Emphasis
added). When you have a court declaring compost not the solid waste, and you have no evidence
to show the quantity of ingredients, and no health or environmental hazard, where is the logic to
impose DEQ regulation on any aspect of a composting operation, relying on a misplaced theory
of “discarded, when nothing was “thrown away”? These health and environmental “hazards”
must actually exist, and pose a risk.
When the court declared compost excluded from solid waste, why are not the ingredients
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also exempt from regulation? Where is the requirement to protect human health and the
environment from the ingredients that produce compost? If compost is not a solid waste, how do
the ingredients become labeled as such? Well, it became such, only because of the misplaced use
of “discard”. Otherwise, they are excluded. That logic is supported by the fact neither compost
nor the ingredients present any health or environmental hazard.
Where is the logic for any policy that DEQ would find any need to regulate
environmentally friendly “ingredients”, when these organic substances are located everywhere
throughout Idaho, never posing any health or environmental hazard to anyone, and has been
regarded excluded for all ten years after the adoption of the Rules?
DEQ cannot and has not illustrated any claim that human health and the environment
need to be protected from such natural substances, and there is no authority to suggest such.
Thus, the rationale for the clarification in the federal enactment, RCRA, with 40 CFR 261.2(e)),
getting away from “discard” and focus on how recyclable substances are to be addressed. The
Idaho Department of Agriculture (ISDA) was represented to be the statutory authority to regulate
composting operations, control composting activities, determine licensing, compost ingredients,
and registration requirements, as expressed in Title 22, Chapters 1, 6, 11, 22, 23, and 45.
D.

RESPONSE TO DEQ’S PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DEQ accepts Appellants’ “Procedural Background”, but deviates in the areas where DEQ

suggests Appellants did not present “an accurate characterization of the proceedings below”. The
Clerk’s record will serve to illustrate the procedure below.

DEQ highlights, from their

perspective, “significant events” in the district court proceedings, explaining their view that I. C.
§39-108(4) is a “Statute of Limitation”, when Appellants regarded it a Statute of Repose, but
wanted to include it in the pleadings if it were to be continually regarded as a statute of
limitation; DEQ then opines Gibson’s pleadings and pretrial filings did not address ISWFA,
RCRA, or the Federal Code of Regulations, only to surface in Gibson’s “Supplemental Reply to
DEQ’s Closing Argument”. DEQ has emphasized Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration,
elaborating upon Defendants’ “motion to reconsider” as citing Rule 11, IRCP, rather than the
proper citation to Rules 52(b) and 59(e), IRCP as it should have. DEQ, however, does
acknowledge the lower court correctly understood the motion to seek an amendment of the
findings, conclusions, and judgment, in accordance with Rules 52(b) and 59(e), just as the
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Motion and Memorandum specifically and expressly addressed only the “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment” not any other prior “Order” of the court. DEQ has made
these concerns some of the five “additional issues on appeal”, and are addressed further below.
II.

RESPONSE TO DEQ’S ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Respondent has listed five “additional issues on appeal, listing them as Issues A, B,
C, D, and E, under Segment II, but as these additional issues are later addressed in the
Segment IV, Argument , DEQ’s “argument”, with respect to Issues “D” and “E”, are no
longer correctly identified, and do not fit the issues as they were identified in Segment II.
Appellants’ make an effort to accommodate these apparent inconsistencies by combining
Appellants’ Response to these arguments, as the issues then appear to be raised.
A. Appellants’ appeal is not time-barred.
DEQ beginning with “Argument A.” (Respondent DEQ’s Brief p, 13-14), argues
Appellants’ appeal should be time barred because the Notice of Appeal was filed more than 42
days after entry of the March 1, 2018 Judgment, and Appellants’ “motion for reconsideration”
did not toll the jurisdictional time limit.
DEQ argues Appellants’ reconsideration motion was solely based on Rule 11.2(b), IRCP.
Not true; the Motion was based upon Defendants’ request to amend or alter the findings,
conclusions and judgment.
Although the wrong rule was cited by Appellants, the motion, and the content of the
supporting memorandums, was directed entirely to the findings, conclusions, and judgment, and
the district court understood the entire motion/memorandum to be engaged in a discussion that
pertained to the findings, conclusions, and judgment, as contemplated under Rule 52(b), and
Rule 59(e), IRCP, addressing the evidence, the allegations in the pleadings and what should be
the applicable law, the effect of which would serve to alter and amend the findings, conclusions
and judgment, if granted.
The lower court reviewed and then ruled upon Defendants’ motion, in the manner in
which it was intended, as a motion under Rule 52(b) and 59(e), as that was the substance of the
motion and supporting memorandum. With the lower court understanding the purpose, intent,
and the substance of the motion, as opposed to the form used, the motion was addressed in
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accordance with Rule 52(b) and 59(e), IRCP.
As the Record reflects, the Motion was titled: “Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and Judgment entered March 1, 2018” (R. p. 12221223). The intent was clear to the court, and the purpose sought by Appellants was self-evident,
as the content served to disclose the subject matter, purpose, and intent of the motion, seeking to
have the court review and amend, modify or alter the Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment. Yes,
The Motion should have been

titled: “Motion to Amend the Court’s Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of law, and amend or alter the Judgment entered March 1, 2018”, and correctly cite
to Rules 52(b) and 59(e), IRCP, but notwithstanding this form error, the lower court reviewed the
substance for what it was intended to be, and the intent was clear the motion was designed to
secure an amendment and alteration to the findings, conclusions and judgment of the court.
Defendants’ memorandums strenuously argued the findings and conclusions did not
comport with the evidence, nor did the evidence prove the allegations within DEQ’s pleadings.
DEQ’s allegation that Defendants were operating a Tier II processing facility on March 29, 2013,
having then been left with only the “ingredients” of grass clippings and leaves as their only
“solid waste”, with evidence entirely insufficient to comprise the requisite volume of 600 cubic
yards that was required to be alleged to be present at any one time. DEQ’s “Tier II” allegation
was not supported even by the subsequent years of evidence presented by DEQ, as the proof
offered by DEQ had no identification of any requisite volumes of “grass clippings and leaves”
“at any one time” to get to their Tier II criteria, and the relevant evidence DEQ needed was
entirely lacking, as no volume “at any one time” was ever established, and to that erroneous
finding and conclusion, the court was relying upon the word “discard” that has since been
clarified in recycle programs, while the court needed to instead rely upon the clarification that
has been announced within the controlling federal law and Code of Federal Regulation, 40 CFR
261.2(e).
Defendants’ motion was filed expressly for the purpose to give the lower court the
opportunity to review, find and conclude differently, and alter the disposition entirely, and that
review by the lower court was to be addressed before any appeal was to be taken, and the clear
objective served to toll the running of the appeal time under Rule 11(a)(1), IAR, as Defendants
were optimistic the lower court would see the argument necessitated the court’s consideration as
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to what should be the correct Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment, and the lower court correctly
considered the entire substance of the motion/memorandum was designed to secure relief as
contemplated under Rule 52(b), IRCP, as the court's findings, conclusions, and judgment would
be affected, if granted.
Appellants referenced their concern to toll the time to appeal so the lower court could
address these concerns, just as it is allowed and encouraged by Appellate Rule, Rule 14(a), IAR,
which specifically allows additional time for the court to address these issues within a motion
presented, before an appeal is undertaken. That Rule provides:
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right from the district
court may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district
court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on
any judgment or order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or
criminal action. The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is
terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings
of fact, conclusions of law or any iudgment in the action (except motions under Rule 60
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or motions regarding costs or attorneys fees), in
which case the appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the
date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. ..... (Emphasis
added)
Defendants timely filed their motion, (as the rule allows), and the substance of the motion
and substance of the supporting memorandum determined the nature and extent of the relief being
sought, Had Defendants' motion be granted, it would have affected the findings of fact,

conclusions of law and judgment in the action. It is always the substance of a motion, not the
form of the motion that controls the intended purpose and relief being sought.
There has been no showing of prejudice to DEQ, as in all civil cases, Idaho courts follow the
treatment of mislabeled claims/motions in accordance with their substance, and there is no
procedural basis to deny relief based upon that error in the form of the filings.
In Carroll v. MBNA, America Bank, 148 Idaho 261,220 P.3d 1080 (2009), in headnote 15,
the court stated:
[15] Although Capps and Carroll styled their claims for relief as injunctive in nature, they
were motions to vacate arbitration awards pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-912. An action
under section 7-912 is to be presented and decided as a motion. LC. § 7-916. Here, despite
the fact that the motion was improperly presented as a complaint for injunctive relief, in any
civil case, a mislabeled claim may be treated according to its substance. See Freeman v.
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State, Dept. of Corr., 115 Idaho 78, 79, 764 P.2d 445, 446 (Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, we
will review the action as a motion to vacate an arbitration award. . . . . 148 Idaho at 268, 220
P.3d at 1087 (emphasis added).
In Wattenbarger v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 246 P.3d 961 (2010), in
headnote 16, 17, 18 and 19, the court therein stated:
[16] [17] [18] [19] The respondents’ motion should have been treated as one for
summary judgment. Despite the fact that the respondents captioned their motion as one to
dismiss or compel arbitration, the dismissal motion, in essence, is also a motion to compel
arbitration. This Court treats mislabeled claims according to their substance in civil cases.
Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 268, 220 P.3d 1080, 1087 (2009).
(Emphasis added).
Further cases include Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007); In Re Weick, 142
Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178 (2005); and Mosier v. Mosier, 122 Idaho 37, 830 P.2d 1175 (1992),
wherein the court emphasized courts always look to substance over form.
Defendants’ Motion tolled the running of the appeal time in this case, as the Motion
addressed the Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered March 1, 2018,
discussing the merits, and the purpose of that motion was made patently clear, within the
Memorandum, stating:
Before proceeding with our appeal of this court’s determination that holds for the
proposition that “grass clippings and leaves” constitute a “solid waste”, and therefore subject
to regulation by DEQ within their Tier classification structure, being the issues forthcoming
from this controversy, it remains the obligation and responsibility of these Defendants to
bring the correct law to the attention of the court, and afford this court the further
opportunity to clarify, refine, and to thereby reverse its decision, as not only are the factual
findings not supported by the evidence and inconsistent with the pleadings and prayer for
relief as filed by DEQ, but the conclusion of law that “grass clippings and leaves” are within
the definition of “solid waste”, and subject to regulation by DEQ, is inconsistent with the
controlling Federal and State law. Memo in sup., p.2
This title and citation error is not the first time this appellate court has been given the
opportunity to comment upon such errors in a motion. In the case of Turcott v. The Estate of Bates,
et al, 45920, Supreme Court of Idaho, June 7, 2019, this court addressed the issue in the following
manner:
“As an initial point of clarification, the district court erred by considering Deann's
motion for reconsideration. Motions to reconsider are appropriate when they concern a trial
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court's orders "entered before final judgment," I.R.C.P. 11.2, while motions to address a trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law should be the subject of an Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(b) motion, which provides:
On a party's motion filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment, the court may
amend its findings, or make additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. I.R.C.P. 52(b).
Even though Deann did not file a Rule 52(b) motion, the district court heard and
considered her motion to reconsider, declining to revise its findings. We note this procedural
Law simply to reiterate that motions to reconsider are an inappropriate means to address a
trial court's findings after a trial. That said, given that the trial court considered the motion as
framed, we will reach the merits of Deann's appeal.”
Though DEQ is justified to criticize the errors of Defendants’ motion, nonetheless,
Defendants’ motion was timely filed and expressly designed to address the findings, conclusions
and judgment, even referred to as being the only subject matter in the title, and argued the need
to amend the findings and conclusions throughout the memorandum. The lower court took the
motion for its intended purpose.
As in the Turcott case, supra, DEQ has acknowledged that the lower court correctly
understood the motion to be intended to seek an amendment of the findings and conclusions, in
accordance with Rule 52(b), just as the Motion and Memorandum specifically and entirely
addressed the “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law”, and not any prior “Order” of the
court, as no such order was made the subject of the relief sought.
The lower court considered the motion, and for reasons stated, declined to amend either
the findings or the conclusions, from which DEQ sought their own attempt to modify the
judgement, under Rule 60(b), realizing DEQ had been handed a rather unique paradox, having
sought to regulate compost, but instead handed a right to regulate phantom “ingredients” only,
aware such organic ingredients were illusive, as they are immediately blended and mixed upon
receipt, and delivered only seasonally (summer and fall), such that it remained impossible to
identify grass blades and leafs when they are blended, mixed,, and incorporated into thousands of
yards of compost, where organisms within the heating stage activate the transformation, thriving
upon the moisture and nitrogen enriched substances that were being introduced to the compost
rows. DEQ was physically unable to quantify these ingredients on either of the two occasions
when they came out to inspect the operation after the Decision was entered. The ingredients,
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once incorporated reduce in volume by up to 90%, creating a diminishing volumetric
determination, had it ever been possible to undertake one.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, in part, must be denied, as the lower court
viewed the motion for what it was intended to be, and the effect of the review tolled the time to
appeal the March 1, 2018 Judgment as the substance of the motion could serve to affect the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, once the court took the opportunity to review
the purpose and intent of the motion and concerns of the Defendants.
B. Appellants did not waive ISWFA, RCRA, and /or federal regulations or (2)
the statute of limitations/statute of repose, addressed in I. C. §39-108(4).
DEQ in “Argument B.” (Respondent DEQ’s Brief p, 15-19), argues Appellants waived
the applicable law, claiming the law to be affirmative defenses, and (2) failed to preserve, as an
affirmative defense, the Statute of Limitations/Repose.
Appellants did not waive ISWFA, RCRA, the Federal Regulations, or I. C. § 39-108(4). They
were each argued before the court and an adverse ruling, as to the application was entered.
DEQ refers to the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), the Resource Conservation
Recovery Act (RCRA), the Federal Code of Regulations, 40CFR 261.2(e), and I. C. § 39-108(4) to
each be treated as constituting affirmative defenses. Citation to applicable law is not procedurally
regarded an affirmative defense. DEQ has cited no authority to the effect that applicable and
controlling law is ever to be regarded as being an “affirmative defense”, or must be raised in the
filings and asserted as an affirmative defense. DEQ makes their comment initially in their
segment discussing “Procedural Background”, to the effect:
Also absent from Gibson’s pleadings and pretrial filings is any defense contending
that DEQ is preempted from regulating Gibson’s facility by the Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act (ISWFA), the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
and/or federal regulations. A recurrent theme in Gibson’s opening brief, this preemption
defense first surfaced after trial in Gibson’s “Supplemental Reply to DEQ’s Closing
Argument” (R. 1178–80), which the district court specifically refused to consider. (R.
1198–99.) Gibson reasserted the defense in a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment. (R. 1224–25.) But the district court
summarily denied that motion, giving no indication that it considered the preemption
defense or that the defense was properly raised. The court simply stated: “Having
reviewed the arguments presented by Defendants in their motion for reconsideration, the
Court is not persuaded that it should reconsider its findings of fact and conclusions of
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law.
DEQ declines to address the law that declares a district judge is presumed to know the
law. See State v. Leavitt, 121 Idaho 4, 6, 822 P.2d 523, 525 (1991); City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91
Idaho 322, 327, 420 P.2d 805, 810 (1966). It necessarily follows that district judges are to also
comply with the law. See Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 117, 233 P.3d 38,
48 (2009).
Not only is it presumed that the Judge knows the law, but the law declares that the
general citizenry (this would also include DEQ officials), are presumed to know (and to apply)
the law. In Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1205 (Ct.App.2000), the court stated:
Finally, it is axiomatic that citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law
once such laws are passed. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 2529, 86
L.Ed.2d 81, 93 (1985); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45 S.Ct.
491, 494, 69 L.Ed. 953, 957 (1925). Ignorance of the law is not a defense. Smith v. Zero
Defects, Inc., 132 Idaho 881, 887, 980 P.2d 545, 551 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). “The entire structure of our democratic government rests
on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the
particular policies that affect his destiny.” Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131, 105 S.Ct. at 2530, 86
L.Ed.2d at 94. 133 Idaho at 880, 993 P.2d at 1211.
In State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1, 310 P.2d 787 (1957), quoting from the decision of the
Utah Territorial Supreme Court in People v. Monk, 8 Utah 35, 28 P. 1115 (1892), the court
stated:
…..But this rule is held not to apply to a mistake or ignorance of the law, for in general
every person is presumed to know the law of the country in which he lives. ‘And in no
case can one enter a court of justice, to which he has been summoned in either a civil or
criminal proceeding, with the sole and naked defense that when he did the thing
complained of he did not know of the existence of the law which he violated,’ nor that he
believed the law to be different from what it really was * * * (Emphasis added)
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) The US
Court concluded:
It is well established that persons owning property within a State are charged with
knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such
property. [footnote 25 omitted]
454 U.S. at 532, 102 S.Ct. at 793.
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The text of the referenced omitted footnote, further declared the following:
As stated in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45 S.Ct. 491, 494,
69 L.Ed. 953:
“All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take
note of the procedure adopted by them; and when that procedure is not unreasonable or
arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations relieving them from conforming to it.
This is especially the case with respect to those statutes relating to the taxation or
condemnation of land. Such statutes are universally in force and are general in their
application, facts of which the land owner must take account in providing for the
management of his property and safeguarding his interest in it.”
See also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 243, 64 S.Ct. 599, 604, 88
L.Ed. 692, where the court stated:
All persons having property located within a state and subject to its dominion must take
note of its statutes affecting the control or disposition of such property and of the
procedure which they set up for those purposes. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509;
North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283. Proceedings for the assessment
of taxes, the condemnation of land, the establishment of highways and public
improvements affecting landowners, are familiar examples. Huling v. Kaw Valley R. &
Imp. Co., 130 U.S. 559, 563-564; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254-257, 262. 321
U.S. at 243, 64. S.Ct. at 604-05.
Appellants would regard the statutes ISWFA, the Federal enactment, RCRA, and the Federal
Code of Regulations, 40 CFR 261.2(e), to be the applicable and controlling law, not affirmative
defenses that must be pled in responsive pleadings to preserve their application. In Turcott v. Estate
of Bates, Docket No. 45920, Issued June 7, 2019, this court has held:
"To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court
below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal." Bedard & Musser v. City of Boise City, 162 Idaho 688, 691, 403
P.3d 632, 635 (2017) (quoting Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 650, 365
P.3d 398, 406 (2015)). It is undisputed that Deann did not raise the tax exemption issue at
trial. Still, Deann did request compensation for maintaining Clarence's tax exemptions in
her amended memorandum in support of her motion for reconsideration. As a result, this
question is properly before this Court.” (Emphasis added)
As DEQ has amply noted and acknowledged, these applicable and controlling laws were
raised before the court, not only within the “Supplemental Closing Argument” submitted to the lower
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court, but also raised and addressed in detail in the “Motion for Reconsideration of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered March 1, 2018”. These authorities were raised and
brought to the attention of the lower court, and an adverse ruling was pronounced.
Though Gibson found no authority to declare compost a solid waste, or that plants, such
as “grasses” and “trees”, not considered “crops”, or that their “residues” were not excluded from
“solid waste”, it was a better direction to override the controversy altogether, and rise above the
arguments regarding the IDAPA Rule exclusions and what was meant by the phrase “crop (plant)
residues” and “agricultural wastes”, and to instead embrace the clarifying federal legislation and
regulations that served to override DEQ’s authority to promulgate any definition of “solid waste”
that conflicted with 40 CFR 261.2(e), precluding the promulgation of any definition more
inclusive and broader in scope than what federal regulations provided, thereby overriding and
avoiding DEQ about-face from their ten year acceptance that compost and the ingredients were
excluded from solid waste, and now no longer excluded by their IDAPA Rules.
Notwithstanding the logic that all plants are capable of being “crops”, each being in the
realm of “flora”, they all have “plant residues”, and the federal law has clarified that when
recyclable substances are used as the ingredients to produce a product that is designed to be a
substitute for a commercial products (in this case compost substituting a commercial fertilizer)
those ingredients are excluded from “solid waste” under federal regulation, and that pre-emption
is implemented in Idaho by I. C. §39-7404. This product, “compost”, produced from exempt
ingredients, “grass clippings and leaves” is to be returned to the soil at agronomic rates (just as
described in I. C. §39-7403(50(e)), and the concern to include the federal enactment, together
with the controlling CFR’s, was deemed to be essential for the lower court to address and apply,
despite the axiom that courts (as well as DEQ officials) are presumed to know the law.
Accordingly, this entire line of authority was submitted by Defendants to the court, with
the intent to “trump” DEQ’s antagonistic position over their flawed position then regarding “crop
(plant) residues” and their approach to the substances to be excluded from “solid waste”, despite
the ten year acceptance to the contrary. This authority was evolving as it was then becoming
partially incorporated into the “Reply Closing Argument”, and fully incorporated into the
“Supplemental Closing Argument”, and further addressed within the “Motion for
Reconsideration of the Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment.
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Appellants argue the reference to the proper authority properly "evolved" (See Ada
County Highway District v. Brook view, Inc., 395 P.3d 357 (2017), footnote 2), in Defendants'

efforts to bring forth the pre-emptive authority believed to control and override DEQ's restrictive
references by insulting the intended purpose of "crop (plant) residues", arguing, after ten years to
the contrary, that neither compost nor the ingredients, grass clippings and leaves, were excluded
from "solid waste". DEQ was now ignoring their own "deference" for their past application of
the exclusions, and now the utter disregard for this pre-emptive federal authority, choosing to
refer to "authority" as an affirmative defense. The only "deference" should be the preceding ten
years when DEQ recognized they did not regulate compost operations. That is the "deference"
that actually should be given, as that would be consistent with what the Idaho Legislature sought
with I. C. §39-7404, addressing RCRA and its applicable CFRs, that control with the additional
clarifications that have been updated since Idaho's enactment of I. C. §39-7404 in 1992, and last
amended in 1994.
These CFRs fully embrace these needed exclusions when ingredients are used directly to
produce a product intended to be a substitute for a commercial product, which is precisely what

is taking place in composting activities, as these grass clippings and leaves are organic
substances directly used as ingredients to produce a substitute product to that of commercial
products, which two of the categories compel that these substances are now excluded from
"solid waste" by virtue of such uses and applications, expressly addressed within Code of
Federal Regulation 40 CFR 261,2(e), with the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act carrying forward

the authority that these CFR regulatory exclusions apply to DEQ rule restrictions when it comes
to any definition of"solid waste", as these excerpts from the statute direct:
39-7404. Consistency with federal law ...... The legislature intends that the state ofldaho
enact and carry out a solid waste program ... with respect to solid waste disposal facility
regulation from the federal government.
The legislature finds that subtitle D of RCRA, and in particular the code of federal
regulations, ....... By the provisions of this chapter, the legislature desires to avoid
duplicative or conflicting state and federal regulatory systems ....... under 40 CFR 257
and 258, to meet the substantive goals of protection of human health and the
environment with consideration for actual site and climatic conditions. . .....
The board may not promulgate any rule pursuant to this act that would impose
conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than the referenced
RCRA regulations of the United States environmental protection agency or the
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provisions of this chapter. Until regulations are adopted, agency conclusions in appendix
B through appendix H, inclusive, per the "Federal Register" of October 9, 1991, shall be
used for technical guidance for relevant provisions of this chapter.
Who is the Board? The "Board" is defined to be the Idaho Board of Environmental
Quality, as addressed in I. C. §39-7403(5). Is that not the same "Board" that adopts the IDAP A
Rules?
The statute precludes DEQ from promulgating Rules that impose conditions or
requirements more stringent or broader in scope than RCRA and its Code of Federal Regulations,
which now has the clarifying regulation 40 CFR 261.2(e), which exclude ingredients used to
produce a product that is intended for a substitute for a commercial product, RCRA is regulated
by the additional CFR, controlled by 40 CFR 261.2((e)), as cited below, and these three
categories mandate exclusion from "solid waste", when such substances are "recycled", stating:
§261.2(e) Materials that are not solid waste when recycled.
(1) Materials are not solid wastes when they can be shown to be recycled by being:
( i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a product, provided the
materials are not being reclaimed; or
(ii) Used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial products; or
( iii) Returned to the original process from which they are generated, without first being
reclaimed or land disposed. The material must be returned as a substitute for feedstock
materials. (Emphasis added)
The court was made aware of these overriding principles of federal law, as we saw DEQ
arguing definitions to defeat exclusions, when the entire subject of recycling these organic
ingredients and their product---compost---has been pre-empted in RCRA with their further 2015
clarifications in the CFRs, overriding DEQ's ability to enact a Rule that is broader in scope to
defeat the exclusions announced in 40 CFR 261.2(e).
DEQ wants to prevent this court from addressing the effects of I. C. § 39-108(4) in this
appeal. That statute is substantive in nature, and regardless what DEQ or the lower court may
conclude its statutory purpose is intended to be, it was raised below, initially in the summary
proceedings initiated by DEQ, and thought by Defendants preferred it be correctly construed as a
Statute of Repose, DEQ claimed it to be a limitation that must be pled as an affirmative defense.
Defendants sought an amendment to include it as an affirmative defense, believing it should
ultimately be declared a Repose.
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If the statute were construed to be one of Repose, it was appropriate to support a directed
verdict, following presentation of the evidence, as the evidence would confirm DEQ was aware
of the “size” of Gibson’s operation ever since 2004, eleven years prior to filing the “civil action”,
and any claim that Gibson’s volumes exceeded a “Tier II” Category, (the criteria that the facility
exceeded 600 cubic yards at any one time), the issue of “size” was the controlling criteria, and
Dean Ehlert confirmed DEQ was aware of Gibson’s compost operations since 1992, well aware
of “size” and “volume presence”, of this compost operation (at this location) and Gibson
maintained volumes of compost larger than 600 cubic yards at any one time at that location since
2004, estimated by Dean Ehlert in 2013 to exceed 10,000 cubic yards of compost.
DEQ has described the statute to be a limitation when addressed extensively during the
summary proceedings, and through that discussion, Defendants saw the need to file a motion to
amend their responsive pleadings to preserve the application in that manner, if that were not a
Repose in the final analysis, and its inclusion within the responsive pleadings was sought, but the
motion to amend was denied by the lower court, so there has been an adverse ruling by the court
and is adverse to the Defendants.
The lower court has regarded the statute to be one of limitation, and the issue remains
before this court to declare which it is intended to be by the Legislature.
Once the preclusionary effects of I. C. §39-108(4) were raised before the court, and long
before trial and during the summary proceedings, there could not successfully be argued that any
surprise or prejudice was brought to endure on DEQ by such an included amendment. This
subject was addressed in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233
P.3d 1221 (2010), wherein the court stated:
“Rule 16(b)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that a scheduling order
may be modified for good cause. In addition, alleged errors not affecting substantial
rights will be disregarded. See also Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,
426, 95 P.3d 34, 44 (2004). Liberty Mutual has failed to show either that the district court
abused its discretion in considering the late-filed motion or that it was prejudiced by the
granting of the motion.”
The nature and application of the statute was raised below, with an adverse ruling entered
by the court, preventing the statute to be included as an affirmative defense in the proposed
amended responsive pleading, and the court declined to apply the statute as a Repose, though
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Appellants argue the Legislature intended it to be. This court has free review of questions of law.
A determination within this appeal may be made as to whether the statute is intended to be a
Statute of Limitation or construe its Legislative purpose to be applied as a Statute of Repose, a
difference of significance as to the manner in which the statute is then to be utilized and applied.
Understandably, DEQ vehemently objected to the proposed amendment to include the
statute as a limitation within the pleadings, rightfully fearful as to the determinative effects it
would serve to effect, if allowed to be included in the pleadings as a limitation, given their
established historic knowledge of Gibson’s operations long before the two years under the
statute, when, in all respects, the seize of Gibson’s operation was common knowledge even to
the DEQ agents (Darrel Early) from the Supreme Court Decision decided in 1995, See also
Defendants’ reference to the statute (conceived then to be a S/L as it was being labeled by DEQ)
in Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to DEQ’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. pp.
499, 503, 513), and in Defendants’ Memorandum supporting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
DEQ’s Amended Complaint (R. pp. 571, 574, 583,584, 586), and referenced within the Motion
to Dismiss (R. p. 588).
Fearful what the evidence would confirm, DEQ became concerned with the disclosure of
certain exhibits that confirmed their knowledge of the operation, electing to “reserve” exhibits
which revealed their knowledge of this composting operation from file documents that pictorially
illustrated the historical size of Gibson’s operations.
From the purpose of the statute, DEQ was precluded from even initiating their civil action,
whether applied as one of Repose, of Limitations, of Standing, or Untimeliness, as DEQ was aware
for the size of Gibson’s composting operations and the quantity of stored compost since 1992, and
this location since 2004, operating for decades, observing him blend leaves and grass clippings with
existing compost, dirt, and soil substances, identified within records and files going back to 1992,
which awareness again raises concern why DEQ is now seeking to regulate compost, when never
before for decades, and the entire ten years since IDAPA Rules were adopted in 2003.
The arguments addressing DEQ’s inability to initiate their civil action was raised initially
in the summary proceedings, then the motion to dismiss, identified within Gibson’s affidavit,
the proposed amendment, and now an issue before this court, as a question of law, to decide
what the statute should be construed or treated when enacted.
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The statute declares:
C. §39-108(4): “no civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover for a
violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule, permit or order issued
or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than two (2) years after the director had
knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the violation”.
It has been well established that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature but a
statute of repose is substantive, defining a right rather limiting enforcement. Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Olson, 768 F. Supp 283 (1991), cited in Idaho First Bank v. Bridges, 164 Idaho 178,
426 P.3d 1278 (2018), Footnote # 3. The question now remains: Did the Idaho Legislature intend
to extinguish DEQ’s right to sue (no civil or administrative proceeding may be brought), or
merely to bar a remedy? See, e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182-83 (10th
Cir. 2012). That case held a statute of repose operates to extinguish the claim after the date lapse,
not to bar a recovery.
As before addressed within Appellants’ Opening Brief, DEQ’s “Tier II” violation is
premised entirely upon “size” of Gibson’s composting operations (R. p. 81, ¶ 34), and seeing the
rows of compost during this inspection, estimated the quantity to exceed 10,000 cubic yards,
DEQ decided to call the compost “solid waste”, despite never having elected to do so any time
during the preceding decade. DEQ knew of the “size” of Gibson’s compost storage in rows for
decades R. p. 513, ¶ 5, L.10-15), including this location since 2004, aware of his operations since
1992, as records within DEQ files confirm to 1992 (Tr. p. 262-265).
DEQ had aerial photographs in their files, revealing their 2011 aerial photography (four
years before the civil action was filed), verifying the size of this operation. That photo was first
revealed in their proposed Exhibit List (R. p. 871, Exhibit No. 10; p. 880, Exhibit No. 10, but
when DEQ understood the effect of the statute, they removed it from their list (R. p. 914, Exhibit
No, 10 “reserved”), illustrating DEQ knowledge of “size” from the annual photos they
maintained. Dean Ehlert acknowledged the documents and records in DEQ files, dating back to
1992 (Tr. p. 263-265).
Though the lower court would not have abused its discretion by allowing Defendants’
amendment, alleging the statute (I.C. §39-108(4)) to be asserted as an affirmative defense (which
the lower court was calling a Statute of limitations), nonetheless, the court deemed the motion
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untimely, and denied the affirmative defense (R. p. 647-648). This court has free review to
determine questions of law, and declare the legislative purpose of the statute, either to have been
intended to be a Repose or a Limitation, and if determined a Repose, DEQ had no standing to
even bring the civil action, since the right of action had extinguished, since DEQ was aware of
Gibson since 1992.
The language used by the Legislature in I.C. §39-108(4) is unambiguous; DEQ cannot
bring the civil action, establishing a preclusionary statute, terminating a substantive right to
bring suit, not just a procedural limitation to enforce a valid cause of action. DEQ was initiating
an action that alleged a violation of a Rule (regarding “size”) that even their own documents
which they revealed as an exhibit illustrated their knowledge of the compost rows four years
prior to filing the action. DEQ claimed ALL substances at the operation were a “solid waste” and
the compost always exceeded 600 cubic yards on any day from and after the year 2004.
If this statute is a Repose, it constitutes a deadline to file the action, and DEQ has never
denied their historic knowledge as to the nature of the operation or its size.
A statute of repose (a non-claim statute), has been likened to standing or a jurisdictional
requirement, not an affirmative defense that seeks to bar the enforcement of a valid claim. This
statute cuts off the right to take action, when the deadline passed. It becomes jurisdictional.
As argued in the Opening Brief, a statute of limitation and a statute of repose may apply
to the same case, while at times the statute of repose cuts off the substantive right of action
before a statute of limitations (on a valid claim) can run to preclude enforcement. As cited in the
Opening Brief, I.C. § 6-1403 was declared by this court to be a statute of repose, and was
discussed in Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990) in the following
manner:
“Idaho's statute of repose advances a policy of finality in legal relationships and thus
furthers the objective of the legislature by providing for "the maximum length of time
products sellers are subject to liability." The classification established by I.C. § 6-1403
bears a rational relation to the legislative objective. The statute of repose falls within the
"rational basis" test which is generally appropriate to use when reviewing statutes which
impact social or economic areas and the classification advances legitimate goals in a
rational fashion. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983)……
“The role of the judiciary is limited when encountering a limitation when
considering legislation, including a statute of repose. The words of former Chief Justice
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Donaldson in Leliefeld warrant repeating: So long as the statute is constitutional, we
have no intrinsic ability to review its inherent wisdom or, if it seems unwise, the power
to change it. Whenever lines are drawn by legislation, some may seem unwise, but the
responsibility for drawing these lines rests with the legislature and judicial review is
limited.”…..
Some jurisdictions have determined that the power to enact statutes of repose that
preclude a cause of action is implicit in the legislature's power to abolish rights that have
not yet vested. Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972);
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981). In Rosenberg, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that a cause of action does not accrue until a
careless act results in injury or damage, and observed that the statute in question ... does
not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather, is to prevent what might otherwise be a cause
of action, from ever arising. Thus injury occurring more than ten years after the negligent
act allegedly responsible for the harm, forms no basis for recovery. The injured party
literally has no cause of action.... The function of the statute is thus rather to define
substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy. The Legislature is entirely at liberty
to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right is disturbed.
Appellants cited I.C. §5-241, also declared a statute of repose in West v. El Paso
Products Co., 122 Idaho 133, 832 P.2d 306 (1992), and in Petrus Family Trust, May 1, 1991 v,
Kirk Docket No. 44784, April 4, 2018, where the Idaho Supreme Court expressed the ruling:
“Section 5-241 is a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, since its operation does not
depend on the occurrence or discovery of injury.” Id.; accord Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg.
Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 23, 644 P.2d 341, 345 (1982); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §
7 (2017). Is that not the situation with this statute?
The lower court, ruled I.C. §39-108(4) a statute of limitation (R. p. 1212. L. 16-23), by
stating:
…….similar words appear in other statutes of limitations in Idaho. See I.C. § 61403(3) (“No claim under this chapter may be brought”) and I.C. § 5-201 (“Civil actions
can only be commenced”). The Court concludes I.C. § 39-108(4) is not a statute of
repose, it is a statute of limitations. Defendants failed to timely plead that issue as an
affirmative defense.
This remains a question of law to be decided, as our lower court did not address I.C. §5241, or attempt to distinguish the Petrus Family Trust case above, where I.C. §5-241 was
declared a repose, not a limitations. Our lower court did recognize the “quantity” of “material
presence” at the compost site was long known to DEQ, and the nature of the composting
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operation, but not necessarily the composition of materials on March 29, 2013 (R. p. 1213, L. 19), stating:
Additionally, Defendants' failed to prove a defense under I.C. § 39-108(4) as a statute
oflimitations. Defendants' claim that DEQ knew of the size of Mr. Gibson's composting
operation since 2004. However, as Defendants have successfully argued themselves, it is
one thing to know that Mr. Gibson has a lot of compost. It is another thing entirely to
know how much waste he has or has received. While there is some evidence in the
record to suggest employees of the Department knew Mr. Gibson was operating a
composting facility prior to 2011, there is no evidence that any DEQ official or
employee knew he was receiving discarded materials (as opposed to purchasing grass
and leaves), knew those materials were not crop residue (i.e. knew the source of the
grass and leaves), or knew the volume of the grass and leaves he was receiving.
(Emphasis added)
It must be remembered DEQ has always been aware of the size of Gibson's the

operations, and never before was concerned about compost, or whether Gibson was receiving
"discarded" materials.
Once again, this "discard vs "purchase" distinction was not raised by DEQ as an issue, as
it was alleged in the pleadings that all substances were a "solid waste" (R. p. 80, ,r 28). The lower
court concluded only "grass clippings and leaves" were "discarded", but nowhere in this Record
is there a statement that the substances, when delivered, were intended to be "discarded" for
"permanent disposal"; rather the opposite is alleged by DEQ (R. p. 94, i-fl5), confirming the
intent was to make compost and humus, for sale to the public.
The lower court sought another distinction, seeking to differentiate between "crop
residue" and "plant residue", finding a difference, but not upon any statutory definition that
would serve to excludes grasses and trees from being "crops", from which grass clippings and
leaves would be their obvious residues.
The court may have gone to a Wikipedia definition of "crop", to the effect a crop can be
grown and harvested extensively for profit or subsistence. How does this attempt to define
"crop" that would exclude grasses and trees from crops, or grass clippings and leaves from being
among plant residues that come from grass and tree crops? That restrictive definition and use of
"discard" and "crop residues" served to direct Appellants attention to the overriding legislation
that renders these applications irrelevant, then citing the overriding and pre-emptive body of
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legislation that eliminates these controversial “word sensitive” arguments, and views these
“organic recyclable substances” in the context of RCRA and 40 CFR 261.2(e).
Appellants argues DEQ’s right of “civil action” had expired, as the substantive right
ceased upon the expiration of the effective period of the statute. When I.C. §39-108(4) states:
“no civil action may be brought”, and declares the trigger event to be DEQ’s knowledge, it
should not be a question whether Gibson could stop enforcement, but rather DEQ has lost the
right of action. The Legislature has the authority to enact a Repose statute, and this substantive
right of action has been limited, like jurisdiction, or standing, and DEQ has a substantive right to
bring an action for any alleged “Tier II” violation, if it is initiated within two years of their
knowledge of the “nature” and “size” of the operation, and DEQ always believed ALL
substances at Gibson’s composting operation were a “solid waste”, (R. p. 94, ¶ 15), and on
March 29, 2013, there were no “ingredients” even in sight.
The Legislature chose to impose this deadline on DEQ, and based it upon DEQ’s
“knowledge”, not an operator’s defense to challenge the enforcement of the alleged IDAPA
violation. This knowledge of the “nature” and “size” of Gibson’s operation has been known
since 2004, far in excess of the two year period to act upon the substantive right of action. DEQ’s
substantive right to allege a “Tier II” processing size violation terminated in 2006.
Nowhere within Title 39, Ch. 1 is any determination expressed that I.C. §39-108(4) is
regarded an “affirmative defense”, or regarded a defense to be raised within Rule 8(c), IRCP;
rather the statute appears to be structured as a sustentative right to act, not a limitation on the
enforcement.
DEQ personnel (when a Division), made contact with Gibson in 1992-1995 (R. p. 510513, ¶¶ 4, 3(sic) 4, and 5; Tr. p. 263) when Central District Health officials wanted a “Permit”,
later stating he was not subject to their jurisdiction after 1995, and reiterating that fact in 2003.
(Tr. p. 497). Gibson understood from ISDA he did not need any DEQ Division/agency
permission to conduct agricultural operations, which included plant and/or crop residues, used in
his composting activities on agricultural land, and what he was doing had been deemed to be a
“permitted use” statewide under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA),specifically defined in I.C.§224502(2).
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DEQ officials confirmed Gibson’s operations were not an environmental concern after
2002, when regulations were being adopted for “solid waste” management, nor any act of
recycling natural organic substances, and Gibson never heard from DEQ until the letter of April
2, 2013 (R. p. 17, ¶ 21; R. p. 50, ¶ 21; R. p. 79, ¶18; R. p. 94, ¶ 18; R. p. 125, ¶18), a decade
later, stemming from DEQ’s “unauthorized” “inspection” on March 29, 2013, and Gibson’s
operations had never changed in “nature” or “size”.
This former “knowledge” comports to the Legislature’s objective to restrict the
substantive action identified in the statute. I.C. §39-108(4). If DEQ thought these substances to
be “solid waste”, how does DEQ explain their decades long lack of interest from 1995 to 2013,
when they knew of, and observed, the many thousands of cubic yards of substances at Gibson’s
operation? How do they explain the passage of ten years following adoption of IDAPA “solid
waste” Management Rules in 2003, with no contact, inquiry, or concern?
The provisions of I.C. §39-108(4) meet the legislative intent of a Statue of Repose, and
should be declared that to be the Legislative intent. The Director must be charged with
knowledge of the Ada County litigation over the conditional use controversy from 2009 into
2013.
C. Admitting Dean Ehlert’s Testimony Was An Abuse Of Discretion.
DEQ, in “Argument C.” (Respondent DEQ’s Brief p, 20-28), argues that Dean Ehlert’s
testimony was properly admitted, and if it were the result of an abuse of discretion by that
admission, it was harmless error. DEQ argues firstly, that DEQ had the right to inspect the
facility due to an odor complaint, which, if there were to have been “information concerning an
alleged violation” for purposes of § 39-108(1), then DEQ was required to secure a warrant,
absent first securing consent or demonstrating the existence of exigent circumstances. There is
no other options available within the statute.
Dean Ehlert revealed in his testimony he conducted an “inspection”, and that inspection
included the entry onto the property, and the DEQ officials then investigated the composting
operation after entry. DEQ conducted their inspection and investigation without a warrant,
without consent, and without any exigent circumstance, the consequence of which violates the
statute.
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Either the inspection was conducted in accordance with the limitations within the statute,
or the inspection was not, and if not, then the inspection violated the statutory provisions, and
some consequence must exist for that unauthorized behavior.
The lower court concluded it was not a “warrantless search”, but if the only authority is a
statute upon which DEQ is allowed to enter upon any “processing facility” to inspect, then that
agent must comply with the limits that authority vests upon him. The only exceptions to a
“warrantless inspection” is identified to be: consent and exigent circumstances, neither of which
existed in this activity that was undertaken by DEQ on March 29, 2013.
DEQ suggests that if the inspection, as conducted, was not within the meaning of §39108(2)(c), nonetheless, Appellants have offered no argument or authority for applying the
exclusionary rule to a civil case “where, as here, there is no constitutional violation and the
governing statute provides no such remedy”. This concept regarding the exclusionary rule and
a remedy, as viewed within certain cases that addressed unauthorized inspections and searches
in the context of OSHA and the mining acts were addressed extensively in Defendants
Memorandums presented to the lower court to strike Mr. Ehlert’s testimony, and those
authorities are incorporated herein, which are characteristic of the application of the
exclusionary rule. We refer this court to Defendants’ authority and arguments addressed in
Defendants’ Memorandum submitted in Support of The Motion To the Strike Testimony of
Dean Ehlert For Violation Of I. C. §39-108(2)(c) (R. pp. 921-945) and addressed further in
Defendants’ Reply Memorandum on the issue (R. pp. 993-1012).
This issue, within this appeal, is another question of law which the court has free review.
This issue was extensively presented to the lower court, and an adverse ruling was entered by
the court, having determined DEQ did not violate any “constitutionally” protected privacy
interest. Whether a “constitutional” violation or not, it nonetheless is a clear “statutory”
violation, and DEQ can point to no other authority that allowed DEQ to conduct the inspection,
and no other warrantless exception should apply beyond the statutory limitations contained
within IEPHA.
The most logical remedy for this statutory violation is to regard the inspection to have
never taken place, and regard the “observation” to have never been made. Otherwise the
provisions in the statute become meaningless. Though lower court determined DEQ did not
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violate any “constitutionally protected privacy interest”. Is that the only assessment to be
considered when faced with a clear statutory violation? But for the statute, DEQ had no
authority to enter upon and inspect or investigate any alleged “processing facility” violations.
If DEQ has knowingly acted outside the authority granted to it by the statute, which
inspection could take place only pursuant to that statutory authority, is there to be no remedy for
that misconduct? The right to inspect is a statutory right to inspect, not a constitutional right of
protection from unreasonable searches. So is the issue the statutory violation of the right to
inspect, or the constitutional right to be protected from the violation of the statute? There is the
recent case of a statutorily authorized warrantless misdemeanor arrest, though deemed to be
prohibited by the constitution, addressed in State v. Clarke, Docket No. 45062, issued June 12,
2019. The statute was trumped by the constitution, as the constitution authorized warrantless
arrests of alleged felonies committed outside the presence of the officer, but did not allow
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors alleged to have been committed outside the presence of
the officer. The statute authorized a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor, so that was seen to be
a conflict, and the constitution prevailed. Here, the fourth amendment of the US Constitution
along with Article 1, §17 of the Idaho Constitution, protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. So does a violation of the statute that provides the only authority to inspect a
processing facility result in an unreasonable search? It would appear the constitution should be
able to protect the processing facility against the unlawful violations of an inspection statute,
and the remedy would be the exclusionary rule. The logical solution or remedy is to disregard
the inspection and exclude the observation, and deny the alleged violation resulting from the
unauthorized and warrantless inspection conducted under the limiting provisions of IEPHA.
To suggest that the unlawful inspection, and the deliberate violation of the statute,
amounts to harmless error is to ignore the statutory limitations altogether.
D. The Court’s Admitting Evidence Post Dating DEQ’s March 29, 2013 Inspection
was An Abuse of Discretion. [Issue “D” is identified differently in DEQ’s “Additional
Issues On Appeal”]
E. There was No Substantial And Competent Evidence To Support The District
Court’s Findings As To The Source, Nature, Volume, And Processing Of Grass Clippings
And Leaves At Gibson’s Facility “at any one time”. [Issue “E” is identified differently in
DEQ’s “Additional Issues On Appeal”]
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The “additional issues on Appeal” separate their alphabetical designation when argued in
DEQ’s Brief. Issue “D” is identified as “deference to the IDAPA Rules” and Issue “E” is
identified as “entitlement to attorney fees”, but in the Part IV Argument, neither Issue “D” nor
“E” is identified as such (DEQ’s Brief pp. 28-30, and pp. 30-35). In the Argument, DEQ is
addressing summer deliveries of grass clippings from Boise Parks and fall leaf deliveries from
ACHD, years after the March 29, 2013 inspection. DEQ argues this Post-dated evidence is
proper, though not related to the March 29, 2013 inspection and allegation of an alleged
violation?
Whether these post-dated deliveries were properly admitted, DEQ must prove a volume
of “ingredients” in excess of 600 cubic yards “at any one time”, not what a lump sum of
ingredients delivered over two following years. There is no competent evidence derived from
cumulative reference to prove “at any one time” 600 cubic yards of “ingredients” at the
operation, since blended, mixed and incorporated substances become “compost”, no longer
identifiable ingredients, and no longer a solid waste.
No volumes were ever determined “at any one time” and DEQ produced no evidence to
demonstrate ingredients were either identifiable or quantified on any given day or “at any one
time” to even suggest ingredients reached the BRC Category (Below Regulatory Concern) “at
any one time”. Gibson’s operation never had identifiable on site, at any one time, any amount of
ingredients even close to the BRC allowances. No evidence exists to suggest or prove otherwise.
DEQ alleged in their pleadings a “Tier II processing facility” violation on March 29, 2013,
having no measurements of any substance, relying on the volume of compost present, stating in
their Brief: “DEQ’s complaint alleged Gibson operates in violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012 on an
“ongoing and continuous” basis. (R. 14, 20.)”. That “allegation” pertained to “compost”, not any
ingredients. DEQ was handed a Decision that eliminated “compost”, but such an allegation
illustrates DEQ’s “ongoing” and long standing awareness of Gibson’s composting operations on a
“continuous basis”.
DEQ has never alleged “ingredients” or quantification of “ingredients”; their only interest
and pursuit was to regulate Gibson’s “compost”, not grass clippings or leaves, knowing they
transform immediately into compost, decreasing in volume.
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DEQ states: “IDAPA 58.01.06.012 pertains to Tier II facilities, one type of which is a
“processing facility” that “has a cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one time that is
greater than six hundred (600) cubic yards.” (Emphasis added). DEQ acknowledges “The claim
in DEQ’s complaint, therefore, calls for proof that the facility had, at any one time, a cumulative
volume of solid waste exceeding 600 cubic yards.” (Emphasis added) The “solid waste” was
thought to be “compost”, but the court ruled differently, and volumes of “compost” is irrelevant.
The burden was to establish “volumes” of a “solid waste”, which came to exclude “compost”, and
DEQ has never made any effort to prove “at any one time” a quantified volume of “ingredients”
present at this operation “at any one time”. These Boise Park and ACHD deliveries came over the
span of two full seasons and different years, not “at any one time”.
Yes, grass clippings from Boise Parks and leaves from ACHD were periodically received
during some years throughout the summer-fall seasons, but no evidence illustrates 6oo cubic yards
of identifiable ingredients, in that form, present “at any one time”, as only manageable yardage is
delivered on any given day, and what yards which is blended, mixed, and incorporated into
existing compost, indistinguishable as “ingredients, and becomes an integral part of the “compost”
volumes.
There is no competent evidence to support “at any one time” any volume of ingredients
exceeded 600 cubic yards, and DEQ never established “at any one time” any measurements of
delivered ingredients, as it was always “compost” to be DEQ’s concern.
This argument regarding “post-dated” deliveries establish no volumes for the required
criteria “at any one time”, and lumping quantities of deliveries over years does not support the
required criteria.
In the simplest of terms, the lower court handed DEQ a conundrum, a “foot in each
world”, that is —the ingredients, organic and in a constant state of flux, are labeled “solid waste”
because “ingredients” are “discarded”, yet the natural product produced – compost, is not a
“solid waste”, a Decision entirely unsettling to DEQ’s objectives, or Gibson’s lifetime
experiences producing compost over the past 45 years.
From a legal standpoint, does this reflect “settled law”, as identified in state and federal
enactments, notwithstanding DEQ’s “about-face” I their ten year acceptance of their phrase
“crop”(plant) residues”, and “agricultural wastes” in their Rule exclusions?
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DEQ is left to measure a vanishing ingredient, unable to regulate what it cannot measure,
as daily volumes, spread throughout the seasons, are relatively small and are incorporated daily.
DEQ never had a desire to regulate grass clippings and leaves; they only sought to regulate
“compost”, but told they cannot, as it is not a solid waste.
From a practical standpoint, DEQ received a hollow and entirely unexpected Decision,
and from a legal standpoint, Appellants contend the Decision is factually and

legally

unsupported, as grass clippings and leaves, used as ingredients to product a substitute product,
under Federal law, is not a “solid waste”, and DEQ does not challenge that compost is not a
“solid waste”. The court’s only distinction between the two was founded upon the word
“discard” used in federal cases, and that use, in these specific uses and applications, has been
clarified in the federal regulations.
“Discard” was historically an element in federal cases under EPA controversies, used to
define “solid wastes”, but the world of recycling within RCRA and the Code of Federal
Regulations has clarified the use of that concept, when the ingredients are delivered to be used as
an ingredient to produce a product that is a substitute for a commercial product.
The disposition of this controversy should no longer turn on “discard”, as the concept has
been clarified when the ingredients are expressly intended for delivery to an organic recycling
program, intended for use as described in 40 CFR 261.2(e).
The correct analysis requires the application of RCRA and the Code of Federal
regulations, where these Federal laws have incorporated, through clarifications, more recent
provisions of their Code of Federal Regulations, now to include their final version within these
2015 clarifications.
The reuse and recycling of organic materials avoids filling up valuable space in solid
waste disposal sites, and DEQ regulates these landfill processing facilities, as a “solid waste
processing facility”, while composting operations were never regulated since the IDAPA Rules
were adopted, until this controversy came into being ten years after the recognized the exclusion
of organic plant residues in recycling operations. Recycling programs include agricultural crop
residues, plant residues, and agricultural wastes, which before became part of the waste stream
discarded at landfills. These organic recyclable substances were always thought recognized as
excluded from “solid waste”, in the IDAPA Rule 58 exclusions, and the I. C. §39-7403(50)(e)
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exclusions, being the policy of DEQ since adoption of the Rules. In a broader sense, however,
these recognized exclusions are now protected from unauthorized regulation by the mandate and
pre-emptive effects of the State statute (I.C. §39-7404) and Federal enactment RCRA, and the
Code of Federal Regulations, specifically 40 CFR 261.2(e).
This federal regulation is the correct solution to this conundrum created by the use of
“discard”, when it comes to these ingredients, which logically resolves this controversy.
DEQ knows they cannot quantify “ingredients” in any amount “at any one time”, and
have declined to do that, even after the Decision of the lower court. Though

it

remains

Appellants’ belief the “deference” DEQ gave to their recognized exclusions in IDAPA Rule 58,
for the continuous ten years following the adoption of the Rules, remains the correct
interpretation of those exclusions, notwithstanding DEQ’s unexplained policy shift in 2015, we
now have the pre-emptive effects of the federal regulations, and they must be applied
accordingly.
Why did DEQ want to include compost in the definition of “solid waste” in 2015, when
both compost and the ingredients were always deemed excluded for ten years under the Rules
they now elect to avoid? What would be DEQ’s scientific basis to argue these compost or the
ingredients no longer to be regarded a “crop (plant) residue” or an “agricultural waste”? That is
entirely missing from this Record.
Why do we see a policy shift on these previously established exclusions? It is not the
intent of the statute governing solid waste disposal facilities, the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act,
I.C. §39-7401 et seq.), where the Legislature announced their prohibition against Agency rules to
define “solid waste” (I.C. §39-7404) outside the perimeters of the Resource Conservation Recovery
Act (RCRA) and the applicable CFR’s? Does that not control the exclusions of what constitutes
“solid waste”, and what can be regulated? Does not I.C. §39-7404 preclude DEQ from declaring
a broader definition of “solid waste” than proscribed by the Federal enactments? Does not RCRA
and the CFR’s expressly define the materials and substances excluded when used within certain
applications that are recycled and slated for an intended ingredient and product use?
Is this not the precise situation with grass clippings and leaves used to produce a product
intended for use as a commercial substitute? Why has DEQ ignored the fact Gibson was told the
intent of IDAPA Rule 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii)&(b)(iii), during agency discussions, excluded
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organic recyclable natural resources (plant residues) from regulation as a “solid waste”, and for
ten years the phrase “crop (plant) residue” has regarded composting operations exempt. How is it
now that grass clippings and leaves are not an “agricultural waste”? Does not the Right To Farm
Act (RTFA) define agriculture activities, products, and wastes to specifically embrace and
include compost?
No language in IDAPA Rule 58 defines “crop”, “crop residues” or “crop (plant)
residues”, so upon what basis is grass clippings and leaves not within those exclusions? I.C. §397403(50)(e), defines “agricultural wastes” to be “manures and crop residues, returned to the
soils at agronomic rates”. Can it be successfully argued that grass clippings and leaves are not
crop residues, when “crop” is not statutorily defined, and no definition expressly says grass and
trees could never be “crops”? These organic residues are destined to be returned to the soils,
either directly or at agronomic rates? They can be left in a field or more effectively handled in a
composting operation, where they are then more conveniently prepared to be returned to the soils
at these agronomic rates.
The phrase “returned to the soils at agronomic rates” is not defined to be “plowed or
disked under”, as those acts are not being returned “at agronomic rates”, which is the rates found
with liquid and spread applications of compost. The phrase “at agronomic rates” requires a
controlled application, which is how you apply compost.
Grass clippings and leaves are a plant residue, derived from grasses and trees, and trees
and grasses have been raised as a “crop” for millennia. Tree farmers raise trees for nuts, fruit,
and oils, while grass farmers raise grass seed, sod, wheat oats, barley, corn, maze, milo, etc, all
being plants within the “grass” family. These farmers raise trees and grasses for products to sell
to the general public. Bluegrass seed farmers throughout northern Idaho consider the grass seed
their crop; grain farmers harvest their grains from grasses as their crop. Sod farmers sever the
sod from the soil to be a sod crop, transplanted to residential lawns, parks, and landscaping,
commercial and industrial settings.
Tree farms raise trees to be transplanted elsewhere, to bear fruits, nuts, oil, pulp, and
provide shade, ornamental landscaping, erosion prevention, wind protection, boundary
demarcation, street and byway improvements, and generally beautification projects. These
grasses and trees bear plant residue, no different than straw and fodder from field grasses become
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the plant and crop residue after seed grain is harvested from these grass plants (wheat, barley,
oats, com, etc.).
This court must interpret the meaning of the intended exclusions within IDAPA Rule 58,
when excluding manure, crop (plant) residue, and agricultural wastes regulated by ISDA, as
listed within Rule 58.01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope),
subpart (.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to the
following .... (b)(ii) and (b)(iii). AND .001.04(b) (recycling centers). The Rule identifies them to

be ''wastes", not "solid wastes", as they are recognized to be an organic substance that will
decompose into compost, never perceived as a "solid".
For DEQ to say the lower court ruled "in favor ofDEQ", knowing DEQ was denied any
right to regulate compost, and unable to quantify any ingredients, appears to be not much is left
to be seen as "favorable". DEQ, instead, is sorely disappointed.
Though DEQ may choose to conceal their dissatisfaction with the results, if this decision
were to stand, DEQ is left with a right to "regulate" what it cannot identify or quantify, as "grass
clippings and leaves" must be blended, mixed, and incorporated with compost immediately upon
arrival to preserve the moisture content and stimulate the decomposition.
To their greater disappointment, DEQ cannot require Gibson to file any "Site Plan", so
DEQ's efforts have actually been for naught. DEQ has come out twice since the Decision, and
witnessed the impossibility confronting them. Who wants to explain why DEQ has gone off into
this direction, when during the ten years following the adoption of the Rules, none of this was of
any interest to DEQ? Is it only because Ada County could not regulate Gibson with their void
ordinance, and solicited DEQ to avert their own "deference" to pursue the control of compost as
a "solid waste"?
The lower court's decision has "opened the door" for DEQ to conduct "inspections",
upon the issuance of a warrant, but what is their purpose? There is no human hazard or
environmental hazard. There has never been a complaint of any health or environmental hazard
during Gibson's 45 years of operations. Does DEQ now want to "exercise a regulatory authority"
over ingredients that they can't identify or measure, delivered only seasonally? IfDEQ wants to
monitor ingredients, why don't they go inspect Boise Parks or ACHD facilities, as they possess
these ingredients? They don't, and won't, because that has never been their objective, and still is
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not.
Though DEQ has been to this operation twice since the Decision, DEQ measured
nothing, and if pictures were taken, they might gather up a bushel basket of clippings in the
summer, and a gunny sack of leaves in the fall, but nothing to get to any regulatory Tier
Category. This entire “inspection” process has stopped since the appeal.
Understanding the physical reality this decision has produced, it is based upon the use
(or misuse) of the word “discard”, with the lower court declining to address the federal preemptive effects of RCRA and the CFR’s that prohibit this result, and instead has left DEQ and
Gibson to enjoy this classic conundrum.
These ingredients, grass clippings and leaves, are being deemed a “solid waste” not
because of any scientific definition, but because of the word “discard”, as historically used in
prior federal cases, but such conclusion lacks any scientific consideration and regard for the
recycle programs that have evolved, thus the clarification that has developed in the federal
regulations.
The “intent of the delivery” explains the reasons for the clarifications that have been
adopted in the federal regulations. Was it intended to be “discarded” or used as an ingredient for
another product at a composting operation? The idea of “discard” was the historical way to
address certain substances in earlier years of federal case analysis in EPA matters, some of which
was cited by and to the lower court, discussed in the Opening Brief.
The word “discard” has become central to this case, and this court must decide if the
purpose of the IDAPA Rules, the statutes, and the pre-emptive effects of the federal regulations
have come to clarify the application of “discard”, and determine the intended meaning of the
exclusions from “solid waste”, when these plant residues are the ingredient used to produce a
natural product as a substitute for a commercial product, to be returned to the soils at agronomic
rates, never intended to be “discarded” for the sake of abandonment, as in the conventional
sense, as the intent is to insure its future use.
Given the intended purpose in the delivery and placement of these ingredients, the word
“discard” should not be the controlling criteria to determine whether these ingredients are a
“solid waste”, but rather what is intended to be excluded from “solid waste” by either the statute,
the IDAPA Rules, or the federal enactments and the Code of Federal Regulations, being, RCRA
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and 40 CFR 261.2(e).
D.

DEQ's Issue "D", identified initially in Part II, Additional Issues, is identified incorrectly in

Segment "G" in Part IV, Argument (pp. 44-46).
DEQ has requested this court to extend deference to their Solid Waste Management Rules,
yet the actual "deference" should be to the way in which DEQ has applied their Rule 58 during the
ten years following the adoption of their Rules. What has been historically the actual "deference"
must be perceived to be DEQ's application and enforcement of their Rules, as that is the
demonstration of their "applied" interpretation of their own Rules. DEQ's application and
enforcement of their IDAP A Rules has historically, and expressly, pursued a policy of excluding
composting operations, both "compost" and the organic "ingredients", from any Solid Waste
Management of Solid Waste Processing Facilities. That is the deference to be given to the official
position of DEQ ever since their adoption, and there was no imposition of any regulatory authority
over composting operations from the date of their adoption in 2003, until this civil action was filed in
2015.
E.

DEQ's Issue "E", (seeking attorney fees on appeal), identified in Part II, Additional Issues,

is also identified incorrectly in Segment "I" in Part IV, Argument (pp. 47-48).
DEO Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On This Appeal

DEQ had requested attorney fees in the lower court, under the same statutory provisions,
and was denied accordingly (see R. pp. 1319-1324). Appellants incorporate that same reasoning for
denial of any fees on this appeal as well. The procedural rule upon which an award of attorney's
fees can be made upon appeal is Appellate Rule 41.
DEQ pursued this controversy solely to obtain regulatory authority over compost, which
the lower court soundly denied. DEQ is left to regulate ingredients that disappear and transform
daily, rendering the ability to regulate ingredients entirely untenable. DEQ has realized they have
nothing to measure to determine what Category to place the unknown volume of ingredients
within.
This attitude of DEQ has served to directly contradict ten (10) years of DEQ's
recognition that neither compost nor the ingredients were included in the definition of "solid
waste". The agency, for reasons originally misrepresented to Gibson during the "Administrative"
segment of this controversy, was told, upon a false pretense, that ISDA had sub-delegated to
DEQ the authority to regulate compost. That was determined to be false, and the agent
apologized to Gibson. Nonetheless, DEQ took a position to ignore their "deference" of existing
policy, excluding composting operations from application of the IDAP A Rules which had
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existed consistently as the policy for the preceding ten years; ignored the purpose of I. C. §397404, refusing to read the “solid waste management” and “Solid Waste Facilities Act as a
unified statutory scheme; and either remained ignorant of or refused to apply the proper
treatment of these substances in a fashion consistent with federal regulations.
DEQ chose to disavow the long held understanding of the exclusionary provisions of their IDAPA
Rule(s) and statutes, and decided to impose broader regulatory requirements than announced within any
Federal pre-emptive legislation/regulations, disregarding any Federal Environmental Protection Agency’s
recycling programs, administered through the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and the
exclusionary provisions of the Federal Code of Regulation, (40 CFR §261.2(e), even after being informed
of their existence. Who is being frivolous and unfounded?
The recognized exclusions within the Code of Federal Regulation are consistent with what
was before recognized to be the intended purpose of the exclusions in IDAPA Rule
58.01.06.001.03.(b)ii and (b)iii, the very exclusions DEQ challenged the meaning of in this
controversy. What changed for DEQ to disregard the ten year deference they gave to their own
policy regarding composting operations? DEQ has only created uncertainty, not clarity, subject now
to a ruling they cannot regulate “compost”, but can regulate their “ingredients”, something they
never wanted to regulate, and to this day, decline to regulate. This controversy has set the stage for a
determination as to which law or body of administrative regulation reigns supreme over these
organic recyclable ingredients that produce a product for a commercial substitute, referred to as
“compost and humus products”.
The attitude that created this controversy has been DEQ’s new found belief they possess a
right to regulate compost, and from that, DEQ claimed Defendants acted in violation of DEQ’s
solid waste management rules by not having filed a “Site Plan”. In truth, it is DEQ who has
abandoned ten years of consistent deference to apply the exclusions of compost operations, serving
to abandon the deference they gave to their own policy of exclusions for a decade, now even
challenging the meaning of the exclusions they relied upon for a decade, and have done so without
any foundation or basis to show any change in fact, in law, or in the operation of these composting
facilities.
Consequently the theory upon which DEQ has premised their civil action, and this
disingenuous request for attorney fees on appeal, remains the same as it was below, rejected there
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and to be denied by this court as well. The lower court’s prior analysis negates the argument that
Appellants have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law”, stating:
Indeed he [Mr. Gibson] has vigorously asserted his position that the EPHA
and the solid waste management rules do not apply to his composting actions. The
Court finds that position, while ultimately unavailing in the Court’s view, was one
taken in good faith. The regulation of composting facilities is a topic of significant
debate in various places and states have taken different approaches to how that should
be done. The application of the EPHA and the Solid Waste Management Rules to Mr.
Gibson’s activities was by no means obvious or straightforward. Indeed, despite their
arguments about Mr. Gibson processing discarded grass clippings and leaves, the
Department’s main concern appears to be that he is simply storing large volumes of
compost and/or humus which, this Court concludes, is not solid waste.”
The lower court’s Decision supported Defendants’ argument on compost, concluding that
DEQ possessed no right to regulate compost, using a concept taken from federal case law, declaring
no right to regulate compost, since it was not “discarded”, but the ingredients may be, because they
were. The impractically of that decision is DEQ cannot physically regulate ingredients that cannot
be measured or any volume determined, for the reasons stated above.
One is left to wonder in what manner DEQ could even be said to be a prevailing party in the
controversy they chose to create, as they were handed both a defeat and an enigma, and have been
left with the practicality they have nothing to regulate.
There exists no factual or lawful basis that should allow DEQ to assert any right to recover
fees under I. C. §12-117 in this appeal, given the analysis of this controversy, and DEQ should not
be allowed to prevail in this appeal, as none of these issues have been addressed in any Idaho
precedent. Should this court properly declare the correct interpretation of the exclusions within the
IDAPA Rules, or more correctly, the Federal Legislation and Regulations that conclusively preempt DEQ’s right to promulgate solid waste management rules that impose greater restriction that
the Federal CFR’s, the Judgment will be properly reversed, and the correct interpretation and
application of the Rules, or EPA’s RCRA recycling/composting allowances and body of regulatory
law (40CFR 261.2(e) will become the controlling law, as Appellants believe to be mandated.
DEQ requests attorney’s fees also pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. This appeal involves
questions of statutory and rule interpretation, for which no reported Idaho cases address these
specific issues. These issues surround statutory and Rule provisions addressing exclusions from
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“solid waste,” and although DEQ would say “Gibson has a legal duty to obey” applicable law—
so does DEQ, so the question remains: what is the applicable law? DEQ had a policy they
followed for the preceding ten years, believing that to be the applicable controlling law or
regulation. But with their “about-face”, what law is declared now to be controlling? Is it upon the
IDAPA exclusions as before applied? Or does it now require an interpretation as to what is the
intended meaning? Is it to be based upon “discard”, or the clarification within the federal
regulations?
DEQ wanted to regulate “compost”, but was told they can’t; DEQ didn’t want to regulate
“grass clippings and leaves”, but now told they can, but there is no practical way to do that, as
addressed above, so what is DEQ left with, and for what intended purpose?
The issues being raised and presented in this appeal are of first impression, and these
statutes, rules, and pre-emptive effects of federal regulation need to be reconciled and declared
what the Legislative intent is meant to be. Clearly, DEQ has strayed from their ten year practice
and policy, and a decision from this court will restore common sense, as the current situation
neither logical nor practical.
Generally an award of attorney’s fees will not be made under I.C. § 12-121 when the
question presented involves a matter of first impression, Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Parktowne
Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 376, 379, 128 P.3d 913, 916 (2005), or a novel question is raised that
has not been previously considered by the court, Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 916,
303 P.3d 587, 603 (2013), or an area of unsettled area of the law is raised, presented and decided
by the court on the facts presented, Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 681, 152 P.3d 544, 552
(2007) (“The previously unsettled state of the law on the characterization of professional
goodwill makes an award of attorney’s fees under § 12-121 inappropriate.”); this result is
dictated even by application of that change in the rule which now permits an apportionment of
fees under § 12-121 as to those “elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation.” James v. City of Boise, 160 Idaho 466, 488, 376 P.3d 33, 55 (2016). See
generally, Wyman v. Eck, 161 Idaho 723, 727, 390 P.3d 449, 453 (2017) (“Fees will generally
not be awarded for arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument.’ Easterling v.
Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016).”). That is what this lower court had
concluded
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On the record of this appeal, it remains apparent DEQ has been aware of Gibson’s
composting operations since 1992, and DEQ has been in control of the administration of the
IDAPA Rules since adoption in 2003, and for ten years found the adoption, DEQ has recognized
composting operations excluded from any solid waste regulation. The lower court has
maintained this continuing exclusion, but without addressing the statutes and exclusions within
the Rules, falling back on the “discard” theory.
After the “inspection of March 29, 2013, and during the Administrative process of this
controversy, DEQ said they had ISDA’s authority to regulate composting operations, but that
turned out to be false. They alleged they made their observations from the road only, but that
turned out to be false; they appear to be denying awareness of Gibson’s operations, until seeing
the operation while inquiring about an odor, but that too has been demonstrated to be false.
DEQ wanted to regulate compost, but told they can’t; they didn’t want to regulate the
ingredients, but told they can. They are denied what they want, and don’t want what they get, but
somehow from that, they believe they are entitled to attorney fees?
None of these issues and questions as to the application of solid waste to composting
operations has been addressed or controlled by existing Idaho precedent.
These question still remain: whether “solid waste” is to be defined and determined by the
word “discard”, or by the statutes and IDAPA Rules, or more correctly by the pre-emptive
effects defined by Federal Legislation and EPA’s Regulations (40 CFR §261.2(e) within their
recycling programs administered under their RCRA enactment.
It comes down to which body of law is to reign supreme. This controversy must be able
to be raised and determined without the presence of an over-arching fear that every time an
undecided question raises itself that a strong potential exists for the imposition of attorney’s
fees. This requires the application of the standard set out by the Idaho Court of Appeals over 30
years ago in Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1984)
where that Court declared:
A misperception of law or of one’s interest under the law is not, by itself,
unreasonable conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled by a question of law
would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party under I.C. § 12-121. Rather,
the question must be whether the position adopted by the owner was not only incorrect
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but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation. 106 Idaho at 911, 684 P.2d at 313.
See also, Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 P.2d 1231, 1235
(Ct.App.1986), wherein it is stated:
“The standard for determining whether such an award should be made is not whether
the position urged by the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but
whether it is so plainly fallacious as to be frivolous.”); and Gulf Chemical Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096
(Ct.App.1984) (“[A] claim is not necessarily frivolous or lacking in merit simply because
it ultimately fails as a matter of law. Rather, the question is whether the claim when
made and pursued, is so plainly fallacious that it can be termed frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation.”).
The theory of attorney fees under §12-121 requires there be both a “prevailing party”
and there had been a position taken by the Defendants that was not only incorrect, but so plainly
fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." See Snipes v.
Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997).
To attempt to resolve these questions and obtain consistent ruling in these circumstances
cannot be deemed unreasonable, nor frivolous. Therefore, even if DEQ should prevail on this
appeal, it should be denied any request for attorney’s fees under I.C. § 12-121.
III.
CONCLUSION
As before concluded in Appellants’ Opening Brief, there is a significant dispute over
DEQ’s right to initiate this “civil action”, or to even seek a “violation” of Idaho’s IDAPA “Tier II”
Solid Waste Management Rule, changing the policy that had been in effect for Ten years, and then
seeking to promote a different meaning of their exclusions, the effect of which is to promulgate a
conflicting rule, when neither compost, humus, nor their ingredients, grass clippings and leaves,
were ever before defined to be “solid waste”, now also to be the federal law, being organic
recyclable substances, used as direct ingredients in an agricultural composting operation to produce
“compost and humus”, to be used as a substitute to commercial products, soil amendments, and
plant foliars, intended to be applied in an agricultural application to farm lands, at agronomic rates.
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The statutory restraints within I.C. §39-108(1)&(2)(c), along with the barring effects of
I.C.§39-108(4), are impediments to the use of any observation derived from an unauthorized
“inspection and investigation”, and this untimely filing of a ”civil action”, if it be defined to be a
Repose, is further compounded by the preemptive effects of RCRA and 40 CFR 261.2(e), declaring
these substances excluded from “solid waste”, binding upon DEQ by the limiting effects of I.C.
§39-7404, prohibiting broader inclusive definitions of the Solid Waste Management Rules and
Solid Waste Facilities that define substances never intended to be “solid waste”, and no longer to be
regarded as “discarded” or “abandoned” when the federal regulatory provisions have clarified such
regard to exclude deliveries to

composting operations intended for recycling, destined to be

processed into the production of compost and humus, never placed for permanent disposal at a
regulated solid waste disposal site, federally declared exempt from the effects of DEQ’s Solid
Waste Management Regulations, subject only to the regulatory enactments identified in Title 22,
Chapters 1, 6, 11, 22, 23, and 45, including I.C. §22-4502(1)(2)(d), which controls producing, plant
compost, and compost ingredients regulated by ISDA.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of July, 2019.
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